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NOTES
CONFLICT OF LAws-MARRAGE BETWEEN FIRST COUSINS-

PA. AcT OF igoi-First cousins, domiciled in Pennsylvania, -for
the purpose of evading the Act of igoil forbidding their marriage,
went into Delaware, were married and then returned to
Pennsylvania. The libel for a divorce sought by the wife on the
ground that the marriage was null and void because of their kinship was dismissed. Schofield v. Schofield.!
The expression, "a marriage valid where celebrated is valid
everywhere," has become a maxim of law. Its exceptions must
be carefully considered in any case in which the maxim is apparently applicable as in the case under discussion.
I Act of go, June 24, P. L. s59, Section x. "From and after the first day
of January, i9o2, it shall be unlawful for any male person and female person,
who are of kin of the degree of first cousins, to be joined in marriage." Section
2: "All marriages contracted in violation of the provisions of the first section of
this act are hereby declared void."
s 51 Pa. Superior Court 564 (1912).
(490)

NOTM2
I. If the marriage be polygamous or incestuous the courts of
no Christian country will recognize it although it may have been
valid by the law of the country where it was celebrated. Incestuous marriages, in the international sense, are those contracted
by persons who are so nearly related that, by the common consent
of all-Christendom, hey are to be regarded as immoral and contrary to the laws of nature. By that consent, persons lineally
related, either in the ascending or descending line, and brothers
and sisters as collaterals, are within the prohibited degrees.'
These principles of international law would require a court to
recognize a marriage which is incestuous (in the more remote
degrees) by the statute of its own state, but which is lawful by
the law of the place where it was celebrated.' There are decisions
which have not followed these principles and they rest upon the
ground that such marriages are against the moral policy of the
state.'
2. Where a statute prohibits generally a class of persons
from contracting matrimony and it indicates the legislative intent
to impose a personal incapacity so to contract, within or without
the state, a marriage celebrated abroad will not be recognized.
The most striking and best illustration is the Sussex Peerage
Case.' It involved the Act of Parliament which provided that no
descendant of King George II should be capable of contracting
matrimony without the consent of the reigning sovereign. Such
a descendant did marry in Rome without the necessary consent
'Story, Conflict of Laws, 8th Edition, Section 114; Sutton v. Warren, 5t
Mass. 451 (1845); Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343, 348 (N. Y., 1820);
Stevenson v. Gray, 17 B. Mon. 193, 208 (Ky., 1856); Jackson v. Jackson, 82 Md.
17, 29 (1895).
4 Garcia v. Garcia, 25 S. D. 645 (i 9o); first cousins, residents of California,
married there and the court in South Dakota refused to annul the marriage
although it was incestuous according to the statutes of that state. Sutton v.
Warren, supra, the marriage of nephew and aunt, voidable by the law of England, where it was celebrated, was recognized by the court in Massachusetts,
although if it had been celebrated there it would have been void. Stevenson
v. Gray, supra, is a still stronger case, for there the parties went outside of their
domicile for the purpose of evading its law. In re Bozzelli, L. R. (1902) 1 Ch.
Div. 751; the widow of an Italian married the brother of her deceased husband
in Italy; all were domiciled in Italy, and in spite of English statutes regarding
such marriages as incestuous, the court was obliged to recognize the marriage
because of its validity according to the law of the domicile of the parties and
"which is not stamped as incestuous by the general consent of Christendom."
This case affirms the English doctrine, that matrimonial capacity depends upon
the lex domfiilii,first laid down in Sottomayor v. De Barros, L. R. 3 P. D. i
(x877). In America the great weight of authority regards the lex loci as governing the question of capacity.
' U. S. v. Rodgers, ro9 Fed. 886 (i9oi); an uncle and niece were lawfully
married in Russia and in proceedings testing their right to enter this country
the court refused to recognize the marriage because the statutes of Pennsylvania
declared such marriage incestuous. Judge McPherson said: "the moral sense
of this community would undoubtedly be shocked at the spectacle of an uncle
and niece living together as husband and wife."
6 11 Cl. & Fin. 142 (r844).
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of the sovereign and the House of Lords found no difficulty in
coming to the conclusion that the marriage was invalid, principally because the special object of the statute could only be
attained by declaring that the personal incapacity attended the
descendant wherever he went. Sluls EstateT is cited as bearing
out this exception, and, while it is true that in that case the statute,* which read, "the wife or husband who shall have been guilty
of adultery, shall not marry the person with whom the said crime
was committed," was construed to mean that "a personal incapacity to marry is imposed," it is submitted that the true ground
of the case and the ground of decisions in other states upon similar
statutes is that the statute represents a distinct policy of the state*
not to recognize such marriages. And to put it upon the ground
of incapacity gives it a smack of English law that is unnecessary
and wholly un-American. Even the Sussex Peerage Case has been
put on the "distinctive state policy" ground by at least one authority °
3. Where a statute prohibits marriage between persons related in a certain degree expressly upon the ground that such
marriages are "contrary to God's law" a marriage between such
persons celebrated abroad will not be recognized. Brook v, Brook"
involved a statute prohibiting a man from marrying the sister of
his deceased wife as being "coitrary to God's law," and in that
case an English subject married his wife's sister in Denmark,
validly according to the law pf that place; but it was not recognized
in England. Authorities differe as to the proper basis of the decision; some assign great significance to the words "contrary to
God's law; "" others claim it as an application of the /x domicilii
or that the statute represents a distinct policy of England."
The three exceptions noted above are the only ones specifically pointed out by the court and it is submitted that they
are not sufficiently broad or exhaustive. The third exception is
plainly too restrictive, for it certainly cannot be necesAry that,
in order effectually to invalidate marriages between persons related in certain degrees (degrees more remote than those forbidden
by international law) that the words. "contrary to God's law"
must appear in the statute. Instead of three exceptions there
are really only two, viz.: the first, relating to polygamous or incestuous marriages; the second, where a marriage is valid according
to the ex loci or the ex domicilii, it may nevertheless be denied
validity because of a "distinctive state policy" of the forum."
625 (1898).
Pa.March
183 of
I Act
13, i~S , Section 9. 6 Sin. L 2
' See infra.
IQWharton, Conflict of Laws, 3& dit., pp. 343, 356.
"9 H. of L 192 (i86x).
"Corn. v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458 (1873); Bishop, Marriage, Div. & Sep.
(89)
Vol. i, Sections 876-7-8.
"Wharton, pp. 327, 358; Minor, Conflict of Laws, 19oi, p. 152.
11 Wharton, p. 36o.

NOTES

Statutes prohibiting certain marriages may or may not embody a distinctive state policy as affecting the morals of society.
Whether a particular statute does so or not, is a matter fQr the
court to determine, in any case where the statute.does not state,
in so many words, that it was enacted from motive of public policy.
The public policy of a state may be indicated in various forms,
viz.: by a series of statutes upon allied subjects, by the ptevious
decisions of the court, or the court itself may decide, as res integra,
whether the particular statute represents a distinct state policy
or not. There are several classes of marriages prohibited by
statute, of such importance that they must be considered especially,
as they bear out to some extent the "distinctive state policy"
theory.
Statutes which provide that if a divorce be granted on the
ground of adultery, the guilty person shall not re-marry in the
lifetime of the innocent consort, have been interpreted according
to two distinct lines of authority, viz.: (x) those states which give.
full sway to the rule of international lav-a marriage valid where
celebrated is valid everywhere--and therefore recognize the
validity of a marriage of the guilty person who goes out of the
state to evade its laws and returns," (2) other states, Pennsylvania
among them, give precedence to their domestic policy and disregard the international law."' Statutes forbidding marriage
between white and black persons have resulted in a similar conflict. Medway v. Needham 7 decided that the public policy of
Massachusetts against marriages between the races was not so
strong as to oblige the court to declare invalid a marriage validly
contracted outside the state. In State v. Ross'$ the parties to a
mixed marriage which took place in South Carolina, which was
also their domicile, came into North Carolina, where such marriages were prohibited. The court of that state, as might be
expected, admitted that the state policy was very strong against
such marriages. Here was an excellent chance to declare it invalid on the "distinctive state policy" theory, in spite of its validity according to either the lex fori or the lex domicilii, but the
court thought that it was so strongly bound by the law of nations
that it would have to recognize the validity of the marriage. The
cases which gave precedence to the domestic policy are cited in
the footnotes though it must be admitted that a few of them were
decided also according to tho lex domiiiii."
"
Voorhis v. Bretnall, 86 N. Y. x8 (i88); Pondsford v. Johnsan,2
Blatchf. 51 (847); Cor. v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458 (1873); Phillips Y. Madrid,
83 Me. 205 0890; State v. Shattuck, 69 Vt. 403 (18
14Stull's Estate, x83 Pa. 625 (1898); Pennegar v. State, 87 Tenn. 244 (1888),

a, leading case; Williams v. Oates, 5 Iredell 535 (N. C., 1845); Marshall v. Marshall, 2 H un 238 (N. Y., 1874), overruled by Van Voorhis v. Breatnall, supra.
17 x6 Mass. 157 (xixg).
"u76N. C. 242 (2877).
"St. v. Bell, 7 Baxt. 9 (Tenn., 1872); Jackson v. Jackson, 82 Md. 1730
(1895) (dictum); Dupre v. Boulard, zO La. Ann. 411 (1855); State v. Kennedy,
76 N. C. 251 (1877); Kinney v. Com. 3o Gratt. 858 (Va, 1878).
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Coming back to the principal case, it is apparent that the
question in the case narrowed down to whether the statute forbidding first cousins to be joined in marriage represented such a
distinct state policy as to warrant the court in deciding that the
legislature intended the statute to cover marriages contracted
outside the state. The conclusion reached gives rise to the inference that there is no such public policy. The theory of "distinctive state policy" was only casually mentioned in a discussion
of Slull's Estate. What the court did say was this: "Where a
statute forbids marriage between certain persons, or classes of
persons, merely upon the ground of expediency and not upon
moral grounds, or such as would tend to outrage the principles
and feelings of all civilized nations, the general rule as to the
validity of foreign marriages prevails." If the present statute
were enacted. merely for expediency it is not apparent what it
tends to expedite. The court correctly points out that a statute
should not be given extra-territorial effect unless its language
sufficiently indicates that such was intended. The present statute,
because such intent was not apparent, is really a dead letter, for
if its purpose be to prohibit certain marriages it will be effective
only- upon such first cousins living in those parts of this state so
isolated, that the expenses of a journey to the "marrying parsons"
of the neighboring states will be prohibitive.
The court seemed to disregard intentionally the case of Mc0 decided only three years ago by the same
Clain v. McClain,"
judges and cited in the present case by counsel. In that case the
same statute was involved by a marriage of first cousins celebrated
within the state of Pennsylvania. It was there said, "The relationship of first cousin was not one of the degrees of consanguinity
designated in the act of x86o (a criminal statute prohibiting the
marriage of persons within the degree of consanguinity or affinity therein prescribed, providing a punishment and declaring
the marriage void) and it is evident that the legislature intended
to add first cousins to the classes of persons between whom marriage is incestuous." Now, if the marriage is void because incestuous and punishable criminally, it is submitted that that is
presumptively sufficient to indicate a distinct public policy that
such marriage is not to be recognized no matter where celebrated."
" 40 Pa. Super. 248 (i9o9).
2 U. S. v. Rodgers, supra;Johnson v. Johnson, 57 Wash. 89 (igxo). First
cousins domiciled in Washington went into British Columbia and after being
married returned to their domicile; the statutes of Washington declared such
marriages incestuous and provided a punishment; the court held that the marriaie was void, saying:. "Marriages between parties so nearly related are pro.

hibited in nearly all civilized countries, and, if argument in support of such a

policy is needed, the fact that the only offspring of this marriage is deaf and
dumb supplies it." Garcia v. Garcia, cited supra, is a case where the statute
was quite similar, but the parties to the marriage were not dbmiciled in the state

of the forum when the marriage was celebrated; the court decided that the stat-

ute did not authorize it to declare invalid a marriage valid according to the
lex loci and kx domici. The court refused to express any opinion as to whether

NOTES

It is apparent that the principal case has given an interpretation
to the statute different from that laid down in the earlier case.
Which is correct is doubtful, but it is submitted that the construction announced in the more recent case should be favored for
several reasons. The Act of 9oildoes not declare that the marriage of first cousins is incestuous, nor provide a punishment for
its violation, nor refer to the Act of 186o, which prescribes the
table of incestuous marriages; it strikes down the marriage from
a purely civil, not a criminal, view point.
LB.
CONTRAcTS-FXING RESALE PRicEs-REsTRAINT oF TRAM
-In Ghirardelli Co. v. Hunsicker,' the manufacturer attached to
each can of his ground chocolate a label stating the prices at which
the article could be retailed. Thus the case presented the simplest form of the "contract system" of maintaining fixed prices
on the resale of a manufactured article. The other method of
accomplishing this object is for the manufacturer to offer to refund
a specified portion of the purchase money to dealers who maintain
the retail prices designated by the producer. This type of contracts has been uniformly upheld; the courts saying the dealer
was not bound to maintain the prices, he was merely offered an
inducement to do so. In re Green;2 Walsh v. Dwight.3 In reality
such agreements are held not to be an illegal restraint of trade
because the consumer can sometimes purchase below the stated
price, i. e., some retailers will cut prices.
The suit was by a manufacturer against a retailer, who had
bought his goods from a wholesaler, and the court had no trouble
in deciding that the agreement between the jobber and the defendant was for the benefit of the plaintiff. This is certainly
sound; as well as the disposition the court made of the manufacturer's contention that the trade name and secret process under
which the article was put out took it out of the general rule and
brought it under the exception in favor of patented articles, Bement v. Nat. Harrow Co.,' which was definitely settled against the
vendors of proprietary articles in Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. Park.'
But the court refused to follow the decision of the Federal Supreme
Court in the case last cited as to the principal point-whether
the parties were punishable criminally for incest. Compare this reasoning

with the language of Judge McPherson in U. S. Rodgers: "It seems to me to
be impossible to recognize this marriage as valid in Pennsylvania, since a con
tinuance of the relation here would at once expose the parties to indictment in
the criminal court.......
.In
other words, this court would be declaring
the relation lawful, while the court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County

would be obliged to declare it unlawfuL"
'128 Pac. Rep. zo4 (Cal., 1912).
52 Fed. 104 (1894).

'58 N. Y. Suppl. 91 (1899).
'186 U. S. 70 (1902).
220 U. S. 373 (191).
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this system of business was an illegal restraint of trade. The
California court doubtless felt bound by its earlier determination
of this question in Grogan v. Chaffee.' These decisions are against
the present tendency of the courts, Park v. Hartman," Hill v.
Gray;' though supported by the earlier cases, Ice Co. v. Park;,
1
Zlimon Co. v. Carrington," Garst v. Harris."
The decision in the principal case would seem- to be unsupportable as applied to ordinary articles; but there may be a valid
distinction between such cases and a similar right in the producer
of an article which has a long life, and which is distributed through
dealers who must give a continued service in connection With the
article. In such case the- retailer is little more than an agent for
the manufacturer. And it may be argued with great force that
if the vendor with whom the customer deals, and to whom he
must look for the necessary service, does not make a fair profit
out of the sale he cannot afford to give the required service, the
lack of which will injure the reputation of the article and so greatly
damage the manufacturer. It is now well settled that it is not
the fact of restraint, but the reasonableness thereof which will
control, Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt & Co.;12 Standard Oil Co.
v. U. S. ;' and it may well be that the benefit to the public in being
assured of this necessary service-the value of which to the purchaser is shown by the policy of the leading automobile companies
in featuring their service--out-weighs the detriment to the public
in being deprived of occasional so called "cut price sales."
For a further discussion of the principles involved in the
principal case, see 6o Univ. of Pa. Law. Rev., 270 (Jan., 1912).
C.L.M.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE- EXTRADITION - PROSECUTION FOR
OTHER OFFENsFs-Extradition, in its several phases and with its

divers attendant problems, has always presented a more or less
perplexing situation to the American courts. Heterogeneous
doctrines of state rights, duties and powers have introduced inevitable complications, born of our peculiar political amalgamation of individual sovereignties. Therefore, the ultimate and
expected result, diversity of opinion on nearly "every point, is
apparent upon an inspection of the cases. Among these problems,
none is more contentious than that illustrated by the late case of
Rv pate Flack.' An absconding bank cashier, who had fled to
New York, was taken back to Kansas on a fugitive warrant charging him with forging the name of the maker on a note. While
6 156 Cal. 611 (19o9).
1353 Fed. 24 (1908).
'163 Mich. 12 (1910).

:2z How. Pr. 302 (N. Y., z86).
10 (1901) 2 Ch. D. 27S.
1177 Mass. 72 (1goo).

n 1904 A, C. 565.
1221 U. S. 1 (1911).

NOTES

awaiting trial, other prosecutions were instituted against him
charging false and fraudulent alterations of entries upon the books
of the bank. Motions to quash these informations were based on
the theory that the defendant could not be prosecuted on any
charge other than that for which he was extradited. But the
court decided that he could be tried for any crime committed within
the jurisdiction.
There are two distinct lines of decision on the question of
whether an extradited defendant must answer all charges brought
against him or only the specific charge for which the extradition
was secured. The early view was that the prosecution was to be
limited strictly to the crime charged.2 Some cases made the
distinction that the prisoner had to be given an opportunity to
return to the state from which he was brought before he could be
re-arrested on another charge,$ or be re-extradited to a third
state.' However, where the different offenses constituted one
course of crime,$ or where the different crimes grew out of the same
transaction,' the de'endant was not protected. At all events, a
prisoner, extradited for a certain crime could be tried for a lesser
offense included in it.7 If a prisoner voluntarily returned to the
state where he was indicted, he thus submitted to its jurisdiction and
could not object to being tried upon any charge brought against
him.'
At the present time, the weight of authority seems to have
come around to the view that a fugitive from justice, who
is brought back from another state, should not be accorded any
greater privileges than if he had been apprehended within the
jurisdiction. In other words, a person, having been extradited,
can be tried for any offense whatsoever.$
This attitude of the courts is difficult to reconcile with the
doctrine of Kentucky v. Dennison,' to the effect that although
extradition is provided for by the Federal Cbnstitution, and the
right of one state to demand such extradition of another is absolute, yet the duty to comply rests solely on the honor and good
faith of the individual states. There is no power in any branch
129 Pac. Rep. 54 (Kan., 1913).
2State v. Hall, 40 Kan. 338 (1888); In re Cannon, 47 Mich. 48z (1882).
In re Fitton, 45 Fed. 471 (1891).
'State v. McNaspy, 8 Kan. 691 (z897).
4 In re Hope, 10 N.Y. Suppl. 28 (1889).
$State v. Dunn, 66 Kan. 483 (3902).
' Waterman v. State, 116 Ind. 51 (1888); Harland v. Territory, 3 Wash.
Terr. 131 (1887).
7State v. Walker, 1i9 Mo. 467 (z894); Com. v. Johnston, 2 Pa. Distr. 6j 3
(1892).
'State v. McNaspy, 58 Kan. 691 (1897).

'Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U. S. 5Yj (1892); Williams v. Weber, I Colo.
A pp. 191 (1891); State v. Stewart, 6o Wis. 587 (1884); Com. v. Wright, 158
Mass. 149 (1893); Carr v. State, 1o4 Ala. 4 (I89).

10 Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 Howard 66 (U. S.S. C.. 3860).
1 Const. of the U. S., Art. IV,,Section 2.
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of the Federal government to compel its enforcement. That being
the case, the state to which a man had fled might be induced to
give him up if he were charged with one crime, and not, if with
another. Now if, after being returned, the defendant were to be
tried upon a different charge, that would be extremely bad faith
with the surrendering state, as well as with the prisoner.
In conclusion, it is interesting to note, in this connection,
that if a man is tricked into the jurisdiction, or is kidnapped and
forcibly
carried back, he, nevertheless, has .no defense on that
s ore."3
J.F.N.

DAuAGEs-Loss OF WIFE'S SERVICES-PROXImATE CAUSEThe Court of Appeals of New York, held in a recent decision that
a husband may maintain an action for damages for the physical
illness of his wife, consequent upon mental anguish caused by the
publication of words reflecting upon her.character, which were
libelous per se. The court proceeded upon the ground that- the
rights of the husband were co-extensive with those of the-wife;
that if she could recover damages for such injuries, he could also.
The primary inquiry of the court was as to the measure of damages recoverable by the wife if she had brought suit instead of her
husband.
Earlier decisions in New York hold that proof of mental distress and physical illness resulting therefrom will not give a right
of recovery either to the person libeled2 or her husband where the
alleged defamatory matter is not libelous per so. This view seems
to represent the trend of modern authority' and to be correct on
principle. The gist of the action for defamation is the injury to
the plaintiff's reputation; mental distress and sickness do not
prove the fact of such injury, but are simply the results of an apprehension of injury. Baron Bramwell said in Alsop v. Alsop:,
. . the law holds that bodily illness is not the natural nor
the ordinary consequence of speaking slanderous words. Therefore, on the ground that the damage here alleged is not the natural
u Mahon v. Justice, 127 U. S. 700 (1887).
1 Garrison v. Sun Printing and Publishing Ass'n, zoo N. E. Rep. 43o (N.
Y., Dec. 17, 1912); affirming iso App. Div. 689 (N. Y., x922).
ITerwilliger v. Winds, 27 N. Y. 4 (x858).
442 (2858).
8 Wilson v. Gait, 27 N.
4 Alsop v. Alsop,5H.& N. 534 (Eng., x86o); Guy v. Gregory, 9 Car. & P.
S84 (Eng., z84o); Sharer v. Abott, 48 Ind. 171 (z878); Beach v. Ranney, 2 Hill
3 (N. Y., 1842); Terwilliger v. Wands, supra, which specifically overrules two
earlier New York decisions; Bradt v. Towsley, 13 Wend. 233 (N. Y., 1841); and
v. Jennings, 6z
Fuller v. Fenner, z6 Barb. 333 (N. Y., 2854). Conkra,
Tex. 458 (2863).
'5 H. & N. s34 (Eng., z86o). In Lord Campbell's opinion in Lynch v.
Knight, 9 H. L. 592 (2862), he said: "I think that Alsof v. ALkop was well decided, and that mere mental suffering or sickness, supposed to be caused by the
speaking of words not actionable in themselves, would not be special damage
to support an action."

k.

-ff
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consequence of the words spoken by the defendant, I think that
this action will not lie."
On the other hand, when the defamatory matter is .libelous
per se an injury to the plaintiff's reputation is presumed, and proof
of mental suffering with resulting illness is offered simply as an
element of additional damage which the jury are entitled to consider. This view seems to be settled law in the majority of jurisdictions.' Therefore, under the facts of the principal case there
seems to be no question but that the wife of the plaintiff, if she
had sued, could have recovered damages for her mental and physical suffering.
The Court of Appeals, having arrived at this conclusion, then
said that it followed logically that her husband could recover
damages for the loss of her services. It is on this point that the
difficulty arises in accepting the decision as technically correct.
The question involves the true basis of a husband's right to iecover
for injuries to his wife. Physical illness, following mental distress,
is too remote to give the wife a right of actiori when, to succeed, it
is necessary for her to show special damage, i. e., whdn the defamatory matter is not libelous per se. If her husband must show
damage to himself, and unless he has an action irrespective of such
damage which vests in him automatically by a wrong'to his wife,
it would seem to follow necessarily that such damages were likewise too remote to sustain his suit.
The proposition that a husband may recover for wrongs to
his wife which result in a loss to him of her consortium or services
has become so thoroughly established that modem cases are of
little assistance in determining the basis of his action, the rule
usually being applied to the circumstances with little or no analysis.
In Robert Mary's Case,' it was said: "And therefore, if iny servant
is beat, the master shall not have an action for this battery, unless
the battery is so great that by reason thereof he loses the service
of his servant, but the servant himself for every small battery
shall have an action; and the reason of the difference is, that the
master has not any damage by the personal beating of his servant,
but by reason of a per quod, viz.: per quod servitium, etc., amsist;
so that the original act is not the cause of his action, but the consequent upon it, viz.: the loss of his service is the cause of his action; for be the battery greater or less, if the master does not lose
the services of his servant, he shall not have an action." It would
seem that the same principles are applicable to the relation of
$Swift v. Dickerman, 31 Conn. 285 (z863); Farrand v. Aldrich, 85 Mich.
S93 (z89x); Bolt v. Budwig, ig Neb. 739 (1886); Taylor v. Hearst, 107 CaL 262

(1895); Hastings v. Stetson, i3o'Mass. 76 (1881); Chesley v. Thompson, 137
CoIra, Prime v. Eastwood, 45 Ia. 640 (1877), in which the court says that there
be
no
distinction
between
words
slanderous
per
se,
and
words
requiring
should
Dof of special damage to support an action. In Butler v. Hoboken Co., 73
J.L.45 (1907), the court held that while damages might be recovered for
mental distress, illness resulting therefrom was too remote.
Mass. 136 (1884); Van Ingen v. Star Co., I App. Div. V9 (N. Y., 186).

79 Co. Rep. 113 (1613).
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husband and wife. Blackstone says: "But if the beating or other
maltreatment be very enormous, so that thereby the husband is
deprived for any time of the company and assistance of his wife,
the law then gives him a separate remedy by an action of trespass,
in nature of an action upon the case, for this ill usage, per quod
consortium
amisit; in which he shall recover a satisfaction in damages.'
The case of Guy v. Livesey,' decided in
16xg, shows the application of this principle. There. the defendant had assaulted
both the husband and the wife, and the former sued in two counts,
one for the assault on himself and the other for the assault on his
wife. It was objected that his wife should have been joined in
the second count, for if she survived her .husband she would also
have an action in respect of her damages, and'the defendant would
have to pay twice for the same wrong. The court overruled this
objection on the ground that the count for the battery of .the wife
was not brought for the harm done to her, but for the injury to
himself; that is, his loss of his wife's consbrtium was the direct and
immediate result of the defendant's wrong.
At common law the husband and wife had to join in suing for
torts committed against the wife, the wife because she was wronged
For special damage to himand the husband for confornity.
self, such as loss of society or services, the husband had to bring
a separate action" Where defamatory matter was only actionable because of special damage, he alone could sue." In Russel
v. Corne," decided in 1702, the action was by husband and, wife
for a battery of the wife; there were several counts for beating the
wife, and one count for beating her per quod the business of the.
husband remained undone. On a verdict for the plaintiff it was
objected that the wife was improperly joined, but it was held that
the gist of the action was the beating of the wife, and that the
per quod.was only in aggravation of damages. Chief Justice Holt
said: "If it had been, per quod consort-um amisit, the wife could
not have been joined." And by Powell, J.: "There the per quod
etc. is the gist of the action, to allow a husband to maintain an
action alone without his wife. But now as this case is, I will not
intend, that the judge allowed any evidence to be given as to the
special damage to the husband; but only admitted proof as to the
battery."
It is submitted that these cases show that the basis of the
husband's action is the damage to himself resulting from the incapacity of his wife. For him to recover he must have shown
:3 BL Com. 140.
'Cro. Jac. 5o (i619).

So Crawley, Husband and Wife, P. 27k Weldon v. Winslow. 13 Q. B. D.
784 (1884);
Hamner
v. Mangles, 12 M.(627);
& W. e1
(1845).v. Harcourt, xLev. 140
Coleman
v. v.
MellerRe,
Dengate
Gardiner,God.369
4 M. & W. (Eng., 1838).
(z66);Litfield
i Sided. 346 (1644).
32 Ld. Raym. 1o31 (1702).
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that he in fact suffered such an injury; this injury or damage
must be entirely distinct from the injury to his wife, for, as shown
above, in such case he could not be joined with her, but must sue
alone. If this conclusion be true, that a husband has no right
of action purely and simply because of a wrong to his wife, it follows necessarily that the decision of the Court of Appeals cannot
be sustained as technically correct. If, as the court stated, mental
distress and physical illness are too remote consequences of a defamatory publication to give the person libeled an action when he
must prove special damage, it necessarily follows that they are
too remote to support the plaintiff's action in the principal case.
Mental distress coupled with physical illness are a "parasitic'
form of damages: when an injury is independently proved they
may be considered in estimating the amount of that injury, but
they cannot in themselves be made the basis of an action.1 '

S.A.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE-EXCLUSIVENESS OF FEDERAL PowER

-The problem of defining accurately the exact limits of state and
Federal authority respectively, upon matters relating to interstate commerce, and of determining when Federal legislation upon
a particular subject is or is not meant to suspend all State rules
in the .same field is one of the most important and complex questions which confront the courts today. The difficulty arises in
the application of the well settled doctrine, definitely announced
in Smith v. Alabama,' that in the absence of legislation by Congress upon matters relating to interstate commerce a kind of
neutral ground is established in which state regulations, passed
under the police power and governing matters of local concern,
are valid until Congress chooses to act upon the particular subject. 2 The controversies arising under this doctrine turn upon
the question as to whether or not a particular Act of Congress is
properly applicable to the subject matter of the case, and as to
14 Lord Wensleydale in Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. 598 (i86r): "Mental
pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when the
unlawful act complained of causes that alone: though where a material damage
occurs, and is connected with it, it is impossible a jury, in estimating it,should
altogether overlook the feelings of the party interested."
See note to Huston v. Freemansburg, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) z (1906) where
cases are collected allowing recovery for fright and resulting illness when there
has been an actual, if technical, trespass, but refusing such recovery where such
damage solely resfilts from the wrongful act and no trespass is shown.
See also, Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, Vol.r, p. 461.
1
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465 (1887).
The doctrine of Smith v. Alabama is directly affirmed in Chic. Mil. &
St. P. Ry. v. -Solan, 169 U. S. 133 (1897), and in Penna. R. Co. v. Hughes, 191
U. S. 477 (19o3).
In Southern Ry. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424 (1911), it was expressly stated that
there were three degrees to which the states might exercise power over commerce. First, exclusively; second, in the absence of legislation by Congress,
until Congress does act; and third, where Congress having legislated, the power
of the state cannot operate at all.
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whether or not a state's regulation is invalid as exceeding its
authority and encroaching upon the field reserved for Federal
legislation alone. The correct application of the law in these
matters is of great intrinsic difficulty, although the broad principles by which each case should be determined are few in number
and comparatively easy to enunciate. In the first place, regulations duly passed by Congress under its constitutional authority
to regulate interstate commerce will not necessarily be declared
invalid if they also incidentally affect intra-state commerce as well.
On the other hand, Congress cannot so legislate upon a matter of
interstate commerce as directly and immediately to regulate at
the same time matters which, although perhaps connected with
interstate commer e, are in themselves properly subject to state
control only. Similarly, until Congress has acted, a state can
legislate upon questions of commerce involving matters of local
concern even though interstate commerce in general is indirectly
affected thereby,$ although any state legislations which results in
imposing a direct burden on commerce between the states is invalid.'

In applying these principles to the cases which arise the difficulty lies in determining, in the case of a state regulation, whether
the enforcement of the statute will, as a matter of fact, affect only
incidentally interstate commerce, when the statute will be upheld;
or whether the actual result of the state's legislation will be to
impose a direct burden upon the general field of commerce between
the several states, in which case the state legislation is null and
void. No better example of the difficulty of deciding into which
category a par.icular state regulation falls could be found than
the problem presented in the celebrated Minnesota Rate case, as
yet undecided by the United States Supreme Court; namely, as
to what extent a state's regulation of rates within its own territory
can be sustained when interstate commerce in general is affected
by this legislation. The converse of this proposition, that is,
what regulations of Congress upon interstate commerce are invalid as directly affecting matters subject only to state control,
3 Southern Ry. V. U. S., 222 U. S. 20 (1911). In this case the Safety Appliance Act of Congress, 27 St. 531. c. 176, Amended 32 St. 943, c. 976, was
held constitutional, though it incidentally necessarily affected intra-state commerce also.
4 Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463 (19o7). In this case the Federal
Act, abolishing certain common law defenses in accident cases occurring in interstate commerce was declared unconstitutional because it failed to distinguish
between employes whose work was solely on interstate commerce and those
who were only engaged at working in matters of commerce within a state.
'Smith v. Alabama, supra; Penna. R. R. Co. v. Hughes, supra.
'Miss. P. R. Co. v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 203 U. S. 335 (i9o6); Coast Line
R. Co. v. Wharton, el al, 207 U. S. 328 (19o7).
In both these cases orders issued by the state authorities to compel the
railroads to stop through express mail trains at certain points within the state
to accommodate passengers were overruled by the federal courts as unduly burdensome to interstate commerce in general.

NOTES

is of comparatively minor importance today, and has only -once
been recently raised in an important case.'
Such being the border lines determining the validity of state
and federal legislation respectively, there remains for consideration what Congressional regulations are, in the absence of direct
provisions to that effect, from their very nature intended to deprive
the several states of their control over different phases of interstate commerce and to impose a uniform federal regulation upon
the subject or subjects throughout all the state jurisdictions. In
the first place, where the object of the Act of Congress is to prevent any sort of discrimination among shippers, it is clear that
the intent of Congress is that this result is to be achieved by having
one uniform regulation upon the matter and to abolish differences
in state rulings whereby shippers in some states are in a better
position than those in other communities. When, therefore, the
Federal statute from its very nature indicates the desirability of
uniformity in construction it will be binding upon all state courts,
and state regulations on the same matter became invalid.' On
the other hand, the mere authorization of the Interstate Commerce
Commission to control a particular subject does not, in the absence
of action on the part of that body, prohibit all state regulations on
the same matter,' nor does the fact that the Commission has defined
certain acts as discriminatory prevent a state from prohbiting
other acts for the same reason." So also the fact that Congress
has legislated in respect to the safety of those engaged in interstate commerce" does not deprive the states of their power to
regulate the size of train-crews," or the payment of wages,U or to
prescribe a penalty for delay.'1 Again, a state may require a
carrier to settle within a specified time for loss of or damage to
freight while in its possession within the state,", but it cannot
compel a carrier, to whom freight is tendered for transportation
beyond its own line, to become liable for the default of succeeding
carriers when the transaction is one of interstate commerce."
It
appears, moreover, that within its borders a state may lessen the
liability of a carrier even when engaged in interstate commerce.",
In construing legislation upon this subject in general, it appears
that a state statute need not be directly inconsistent with the
7 Note 4, supra.
3 Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426 (tgo6).
' Miss. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Larrabee Flour Mills, 211 U. S. 612 (I9o8).
10Puritan Coal Mining Co. v. Penna. R. R. Co., 237 Pa. 42o (1912).
n The Safety Appliances Act, see Note 2, SUPrM.
1" Pittsburgh, C. C. and St. L. R. Co. v. State, 172 Ind. 147 (19o8).
"State v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 147 S. W. Rep. x18 (Mo., 1912).
" Traynham v. Charleston & Car. Ry., 71 S. E. Rep. 813 (S. C., 1911).

"At. Coast Line Rt. Co. v. Mazursky,

2z6

U. S. 122

(1910).

"4Central R. Rt. of Ga. v. Murphy, 196 U. S. 194 (1904).
17 Martin v. P. and L. E. Rt. CO., 203 U. S. 284 (1906). sustainF the constitutionality of Pa., Act of April 4, 1868, P. L. 8, making a railroadsa liability
for injury to a postal clerk the same as to a railroad employee.
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federal regulation to be invalid,S though a clear intention to sus-

pend the state's power must be shown", and the action of Congress
must be specific in order to be paramount."9
A typical instance of the variations of opinion as to how far
Congress, by its legislation, intends to place a particular field of
interstate commerce under uniform federal regulation alone is
found in the decisions construing the Carmack Amendment to
the Hepburn ActL in its bearing on contracts lessening the liability
" of carriers. Prior to the passage of this Act in i9o6, the rule on
the subject of contracts made by carriers in regard to liability on
interstate shipments was either that of the general common law
as declared by the United States Supreme Court" and consequently in force in all the federal tribunals, or that prescribed by
the statute law of a particular state" or that determined by the
supposed public policy of a particular commonwealth," and the
federal courts ini each instance administered the state law upon
the matter," on the theory that such contracts did not raise any
federal questions to give a United States court jurisdiction.
because they were held not to be in any way a regulation of
interstate commerce.
Since its enactment the Carmack Amendment has been
frequently construed by various state courts as to its bearing
upon state rules in regard to these agreements, but it was not until
very recently indeed that the point was decided in the United
States Supreme Court. As is pointed out in a very able review
of this subject in Vol. 6o U. of P. Law Rev., p. 38 (19ii), the
earliest cases upon this field, while silent upon the effect of the
Amendment upon so-called agreements of valuation, were not in
harmony as to the precise meaning and scope of the statute in
general.

In Southern Pac. Co. v. Crensha&' the Georgia Supreme

Court held that the Amendment only covered all contracts made
"Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424 (1g1).
'$Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137 (1902).
0Miss. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Larrabee Flour Mills, 211 U. S.612 (19o8).
"1Act June 29, 1906; 34 St. 584, c. 3591.
The Amendment makes the initial carrier liable for any loss caused by it
or any subsequent carrier and forbids contracting out of this liability, with the
anded
riso law.
that the shipper shall not be deprived of any remedy he has
under existing
SHart v Penna. R. R. Co., 112 U. S. 331 (1884). Limited liability contracts when made on the basis of the shippers valuation and in consideration of
reduced rates were declared valid.
Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Solan, 16 U. S. 133 (1897). A state statute forbidding any contract in limitation of liability for damage occurring within the
state was held valid and binding on an interstate shipment of goods.
"Grogan v. Adams Express Co., 114 Pa. 523 (1886). In this case the
Penna. court refused to accept as binding on them the contrary federal doctrine
announced in Hart v. Penna. R.R. Co., su~ro.
SPenna. R. R. Co. v. Hughes, igi°U.S. 471 (1904). Held, that these
contracts did not in themselves present any federa question and consequently
the law of the particular state applied. See also R. R. Co. v. Solan, supra
Is 5 Ga. App. 675 (1908).
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by the initial carrier in limitation of its liability after the shipment
had passed to connecting carriers and rendered such contracts
void. They further declared that, under the Abilene Oil case
rule, the Amendment overruled all state regulations upon this
matter; and the same view was taken in a subsequent New Jersey
case. 7 In New York" and Massachusetts," however, the conclusion was reached that contracts limiting the liability of the
carrier to a lesser valuation agreed upon between shipper and
carrier and upon which a lower rate was charged were not in
reality contracts in limitation of liability within the meaning of
the Act. The view adopted in the review of this matter referred
to ante was that in 1911 the opinion of the courts seemed to be
that the Carmack Amendment neither prohibited nor sanctioned
these so-called valuation agreements and that such contracts, not
being included within the scope of this federal legislation, were
still to be construed according to the various state laws. The
correctness of this conclusion was borne out by subsequent decisions of the State Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania in Wright v.

Adams Ex. Co.;3o of North Carolina in Pace Mule Co. v. Seaboard
Air Line R. Co.," and of South Carolina in Elliott v. At. Coast
Line Ry. Co." In a word, the state courts have been practically
unaninious in declaring that the Federal Statute of i9o6 did
not show an intent on the part of Congress to exclude the states
from applying their individual law upon these valuation agreements, and consequently the doctrine of Penna. R. R. Co. v.
Hughes"s should still apply.
These state court decisions, recent as they are, have all been
overruled and the entire question as to the validity of contracts
of this character has been finally settled by one of the latest decisions of the United States Supreme Court. In Adams Express
Co. v. Croninger," decided in January, the Supreme Court held
that in enacting the Carmack Amendment Congress intended to
adopt a uniform rule as co the liabilitl imposed upon interstate
carriers by the regulations contained in bills of lading and to relieve such contracts from the diversity of interpretation to which
they had heretofore been subjected. The opinion then concluded
that the provision of the act iorbidding exemptions from liability
imposed by the act was not violated by these valuation agreements,
and, therefore, the common law doctrine laid down in Harry.Penna.
2 Travis v. Wells Fargo Co., 79 N. J. L. 83 (1909).
2, Greenwald v. Barrett, 199 N. Y. 170 (1910).
2 Bernard v. Adams Express Co., 205 Mass. 254 (1910).
So230 Pa. 635 (i911). In this case it was expressly declared that the Car.
mack Amendment did not require the Penna. courts to administer the contrary
federal law, and aee following this decision Dodge v. Adams Ex. Co., 61 Pa.
Sup. Ct. 474 (December, 1912).
3176 S. E. Rep. 513 (N. C., 1912)."
1275 S. E.Rep. 886 (S. C., 1912).
n Supra.
3 226 U. S. 491 (1913).
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R. R. Co.36 applied and such contracts were valid.

It follows

accordingly that, since the act is construed as showing an intent
upon the part of Congress to place this entire field under federal
jurisdiction only, the federal construction of such contracts must
be binding upon the various state courts.
The conclusion reached, therefore, is that the doctrines announced in Penna. R. R. Co. v. Hughes' and Chicago, etc. R. Co.

v. Solanl' have been abolished by the Carmack Amendment, and
all questions of the construction of contracts relating to a carrier's
liability must be determined by the various state courts in accordance with the views of the federal tribunals on the subject.
The chief interest of the decision lies in its indication of the great
importance of the principle laid down in the famous Abilene Oil
case in regard to the desirability of uniform regulations in interstate commerce, though it is also illustrative of the application of
this doctrine as well as indicative of the present tendency of the
Supreme Court to extend as far as possible the federal control
over matters relating to commerce between the states.
P. C. M., Jr.

LEGAL ETHics-Three more of the questions and answers
published by the New York County Lawyers Association Committee on Professional Ethics are given here, in the belief they
will be of interest to our readers.
QUESTION:
Would you consider it unprofessional for a lawyer, who- is the attorney for
executors, about to account, to write to a large number of European legatees
who are not ripresented by an attorney, advising them to be so represented in
this County and suggesting the name of a reputable lawyer. here, and enclosing
a Power of Attorney and asking for its execution and proper acknowledgment?
Funds being ample to pay all such legatees in full and the attorney to receive
payment thereof, and transmit to them less his stated charges for collection?
All this with the view of expediting the accounting and saving time and expense
in advertising the citation. And thii with no expectation or understanding of
division of fees or any possible suggestion of condoning any possible irregularities
in the accounting?

ANSWER:
In our opinion, it is not proper professional conduct for a lawyer in the
case stated to volunteer the name or urge the employment of an attorney to
represent parties whose interests or position on the record may be adverse.
QUESTION:
Is it the opinion of the Committee that members of the Bar should not
resort to the solicitation of business by means of a communication in the following form?
"Gentlemen:
I would like to submit a proposition to take care of all your legal
matters under a yearly contract at less than your collections alone now
cost; in order to make a client of you.

I Supra.
USupra.

NOTES
My method is now being used by many large reputable firms and
corporations in this city, to whom I would be pleased to refer you.
I shall be pleased to call upon you and expain in detail.
ery truly yours,
A. B. C."
ANSWER
It is the opinion of this Committee such solicitation of business is improper.
QUESTION:
"A" defended a divorce action brought against "X.," against whom a
decree of absolute divorce was rendered in New York State. The final decree
having been signed, and "X" desiring to marry the corespondent, sought the
advice of "A" as to how this could be done by her without incurring any penalty
in the State of New York. "A" advised her to go to Connecticut and marrIy
there, and furthermore accompanied her and the corespondent to Connecticut
and "gave her away."
Do you consider that "A" has done anything which should subject him to
censure?
ANSWER:
The question involves two inquiries. The first relates to the'lawyer's duty
to his client, to wit:
(z) Is the lawyer censurable for having advised his client that
she might lawfully proceed contrary to the letter of the decree?
The second involves the lawyer's duty to the profession and perhaps to the
court and to the community:
(2) Is he censurable for having facilitated, and taken part in a marriage-ceremony which was contrary to the letter of the decree?
A minority of this Committee are firm in the conviction that the conduct
of the attorney is censurable in respect to both aspects of the question.
A majority agree that:
(i) It was not improper for the lawyer, when asked to advise upon
that point, to inform his client that the prohibition against the remarriage
of the guilty party contained in the decree in a divorce action, is a penalty which neither has, nor was intended by the Legislature to have,
any effect beyond the borders of the state; and to advise her that she
might contract a marriage in Connecticut which would be recognized
as valid in New York, and would not be punishable as a contempt of
court.
(2) The attorney's conduct in facilitating and participating in the marriage ceremony in Connecticut is likely to be misunderstood, owing to tne
very general misapprehension as to the scope of such a decree. For this
reason such conduct tends to diminish public respect for the profession,
if not for our courts and their decrees, and (unless justified by circumstances not disclosed in the question, and done with the purpose of avoiding still greater evils to follow) is open to criticism.
The Committee had before them Sections 6 and 8 of the Domestic Relations Law, and cases such as Thorp v. Thorp, go N. Y. 602 ,and Van Voorhis
v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. z8.
TRUSTS-CHARITABLE USES-WHEN SUSTAINZD-A question
arose in Re Cunningham's Will upon the validity of a gift in the
testator's will of fifty thousand dollars, to his executors, "to be
by them applied in their best judgment and discretion to such
charitable and benevolent associations and institutions of learning
for the general uses and purposes of such associations and institu1

zoo N. E. Rep. 437 (N. Y., z9z2).
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tions as my said executors may select and in such sums respectively
as they may deem proper." The court held the gift to be a valid

charitable bequest.
Charities have been variously defined, but their scope has
been expressed with unusual clearness by Mr. Justice Gray in
Jackson v. Philips:1 "A charity in the legal sense may be defined
as a gift to be applied consistently with existing laws for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their
minds or hearts under the influence of education or religion, by
relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint, by
assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or
maintaining public buildings or works, or otherwise lessening the
burdens of government."
The early history of the law of charitable trusts is extremely
obscure, and there is considerable uncertainty regarding their
origin and growth.' The cases point to an origin in the civil Jaw,
but at an early period the doctrine had become part of the common
law. The general objects which come within the description of
"charitable uses" were enumerated in the Statute of Charitable
Uses passed in the reign of Queen Elizabeth;&"The relief of aged,
impotent, and poor people; .the maintenance of maimed and sick
soldiers and mariners; the support of schools of learning, free
schools, and scholars of universities; repairs of bridges, ports,
havens, causeways, churches, sea-banks and highways; education
and prefernient of orphans; the relief, stock and maintenance of
houses of correction; marriage of poor maids; aid and help of
young tradesmen, handicraftsmen, and persons decayed; relief
or redemption of prisoners and captives; aid of poor inhabitants
concerning payment of fifteenths, setting out of soldiers, and other
taxes." Both English and American Courts, however, have never
regarded this enumeration as exhaustive, and those purposes are
deemed charitable in the legal sense "which the statute of 43
Elizabeth enumerates or which by analogy are deem.ed within its
spirit and intendment."6
It is well settled in England that if the donor sufficiently shows
his intention to create a charity, and indicates its general nature
214

Allen 539 (Mass., x867).

See Perry on Trusts, Section 689, ed seq.; Flint, Trusts and Trustees, Section 268.
4White v. White, x Bro. Ch. 12 (Eng., 1778): "The cases have proceeded
upon notions adopted from the Roman and civil law, which are very favorable
to charities, that legacies given to public uses, not ascertained, shall be applied

to some proper object." And see Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. Jr. 36, 69
(1803); Willams v. Williams, 8 N. Y. 525 (1853); Jackson v. Phillips, 14
Allen 539, 5 (Mass., 1867).
43 Elizabeth, c. 4. For a discussion of this statute and the "Legal Meaning of Charity," see Laws of England, Earl of Halsbury, Vol. 4, P. io6, et seq.,
and Tudor on Charities and Mortmain, Fourth Edition, p. 13.
4 Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. 405 Eng., 1804), io Ves.522 (Eng.,
1805); Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 539. 551 (Mass., x867); In re Foveaux, 2
Ch. Soi (Eng., z8g9).
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and purpose, the trust will be sustained and enforced, although
there may be indefiniteness in the declaration and description and
although much may be left to the discretion of trustees., This
uncertainty, however, must not be carried too far. The intention of the donor to create some kind of charity, religious, benevolent, educational, or otherwise, must not be left uncertain,$ an
the purpose, whatever be its particular object must benefit some
indefinite class or portion of the public, for mere private charities
are governed by the rules which apply to ordinary private trusts,
as the rule against perpetuities, and that requiring definiteness as
to the beneficiaries of the trust.'
In administering charitable gifts, the English courts have
leaned so strongly in favor of sustaining these trusts, even when
the donor's specified purpose becomes impracticable, that they
have fully established the so-called doctrine of cy pres, under
which, where ther6 is an intention exhibited to devote the gift
to charity, and no object is mentioned, or the particular object
fails, the court will execute the trust cy pres, or as nearly as possible, in accordance with the expressed intention.&$
In this country the doctrine of charitable trusts has not everyT
So Whicker v. Hune, 14 Beav. so (x851): Gift to trustees "to apply in
such manner as they in their uncontrolled discretion should think proper for the
benefit, advancement, and propagation of education and learning in every part
of the world;" and Lewis v. Allenby, L. R. IoEq. 668 (187o): bequest of residue
of personalty to trustees, "to divide among such charities in England as they
in their sole and * unco~ntrolled discretion shall think proper. " Similarly indefinite gifts were upheld in Attorney General v. Herrick. Amb. 712 (1772);
Nash v. Morley, 5 Beav. 177 (z842); Townsend v. Carus, 3 Hare 255 (1844);
Wilkinson v. Lindgren, L. R. 5 Ch. 570 (1870); In re White, 1893 2 Ch. 41; IX
re Darling, 1896 1 Ch. 50.
$ In Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. 405 (1804), 10 Ves. 522 (18o), a
bequest to a trustee "for such objects of benevolence and liberality, as the trustee
in his own discretion shall most approve, " was held void, on the ground that the
words used did not necessarily apply to a charit, in the legal sense. In Kendall v. Granger, 5 Beav. 3oo (1842), the words "general utility" were said to
comprehend purposes not charitable. The same rule has been applied in England to the expressions "charitable or benevolent purposes," "charitable or
public purposes," etc.: Vesey v. Jameson, z Sim. & St. 68 (z822); Williams
v. Kershaw, 5 Clark & F. 111 (1835); Ellis v. Selby, i My. & Cr. 286 (x836);
In re Jarman's Estate, L. R. 8 Chan. Div. 584 (1878); In re McDuff, £896 2
Ch. 45i;
Duncan,
£Zo2 A. C. 7.
But Blair
wherev.the
expression
"charitable and benevolent institutions is used.
the English courts have held the gift valid, as meaningcharitable institutions
which were also benevolent: Miller v. Rowan, 5 Clark & F. 99 (837); Ix ra

Best, 190 4 2 Ch.354.

'Pomeroy's Equit Jurisprudence, Section 1o2o; Tudor, Charities and
Mortmain, Fourth Edition, p. 37; Gibbs v. Rumnmy, 2 V. & B. 294 (£813);
Fowler v. Garlike, i Russ. & M. 232 (x83o); Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 539
(Mass., £867).
i0See "The Doctrine of Cy Pres as applied to charities," McGrath; Flint,
Trusts and Trustees, Sec. 232; Tyssen, Charitable Bequests, p. 440 e seq.; Tudor,
Charities and Mortmain, Fourth Edition, p. 14o; Bispham, Equity, Section 126.
Cases both in England and this country, wherein the doctrine of cy pres is considered and applied, are collected and explained by Mr. Justice Gray, inJackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 539 (Mass., £867).
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where been so fully upheld. In many of the states the English
theory seems to have been accepted with little or no modification:
while mere indefiniteness in the designation of beneficiaries will
not invalidate the charitable trust, t yet it must clearly appear that
a charity in the legal sense is intended and not some other object,
however worthy."2 In these jurisdictions -the courts have sometimes gone farther, and repudiated the English distinction between
"charitable" and " benevolent" or kindred words, or at least have
shown a strong inclination to infer from the context of the will
that such words are used as synonymous with "charitable. "i
In other states, more certainty in defining the purposes of the
charity and the classes of persons who are intended to be the beneficiaries is required in order to sustain the gift, than is necsary
under the English rule.", It seems impossible to formulate any
more specific American rule, since there is a radical difference in
the theories and fundamental views prevailing in the various
states.

The New York courts had held numerous charitable gifts,
which would clearly-have been upheld in England, invalid for uncertainty,' and the Act of 1893" may be said to be the direct
result of the decision in the Tilden uill case,1' in which the charitable trust, which the testator attempted to establish, was adjudged
invalid on account of the indefiniteness and uncertainty of the
u Going v. Emery, i6 Pick £07 (Mass., 1834); Wells, Executor v. Doane,
3Gray 201 (Mass., 1855); Saltonstall v. Saunders, ixAllen 446 (Mass., 1865);
Fellows v. Miner, 119 Mass. 541 (Mass., 1875); Derby, Executor, v. Derby,
4 R. I. 414 (1856); Treat's Appeal, 30 Conn. 113 (x86); Miller v. Atkinson, 63
N. C. 537 (1869); Everett v. Carr, 59 Me. 325, 334 (1871); Craig v. Secrist, 54
Ind. 42o (1876); Clement v. Hyde. 5o Vt. 717 (1878); Goodell v. Union Association, 29 N. J. Eq. 32 (1878); Hunt v. Fowler, 121 IlL 269 (1887); Fox v.
Gibbs, 86 Me. 87 (1893).
"Thompson's Executors v. Norris, 2o N. J. Eq. 491 (z869); Nichols v.
Allen, 13o Mass. 211 (1878); Bristol v. Bristol, 53 Conn. 242 (1885).
"See note 8, supra; Saltonstall v. Sanders, xx Allen 446 (Mass., 1865);
Rotch v. Emerson, 105 Mass. 431 (187o); Pell v. Mercer, 14 R. I. 413 (1882);
Weber v. Bryant, 161 Mass. 400 (1894); Murhe 's Estate, 184 Pa. 311 (1898).
"Needles v. Martin, 33 Md. 6o9 (i87o); Attorney General v. Soule, 28
Mich. 153 (1873); Heiss, Executor, v. Murphey, 40 WIs. 276 (1876); Johnson
v. Johnson, 92 Tenn. 559 (1893); Moran v. Morah, 104 Ia. 26 (1897).
"The opinion of Rapallo, J., in Holland v. Alcock, zo8 N. Y. 312 (t888),
contains an exhaustive review of the earlier New York decisions, and see Fosdick v. Town of Hempstead, 125 N. Y. 581 (1891); Rose v. Hatch, 125 N. Y.
427 (1891); People v. Powers, 147 N. Y. 104 (1895): decided subsequent to
Act of 1893, but the will was considered as of the date of testatrix! death, prior
to the act.
"9Laws of 1893, Chapter 701, now embodied in Personal Property Law,
Section 12 (Consolidated Laws of 1909, c. 41) providing that:
'i. No gift, grant or bequest to religious, educational, charitable or benevolent uses, which shall in other respects be valid under the laws of this state,
shall be deemed invalid by reason of the indefiniteness or uncertainty of the
persons designated as the beneficiaries thereunder in the instrument creating
the same. ....
"'-The Attorney General shall represent the beneficiaries in all cases and
it shal be his duty to enforce such trusts by proper proceedings inthe courts.
17Tilden v. Green, 33o N. Y. 29 (z89r).
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beneficiaries. Notwithstanding the effect of this legislation, providing that no gift to religious, educational, charitable, or benevolent uses, in other respects valid, shall be deemed invalid by reason of the indefiniteness or uncertainty of the persons designated
as beneficiaries, it is still necessary in New York for a testator
"to define his purpose and intention in making a trust sufficiently
so that the court, at the instance of the Attorney General representing the beneficiaries, can by order direct in carrying out the
trust duty."1
If, however, the gift is clearly within the legal conception of
a "charity" mere indefiniteness or uncertainty in the designation
of the beneficiaries is no longer objectionable; under the decision
in Matter of Robinsonle and in our principal case, the Court of
Appeals of New York appears to have adopted the English rule
upon the subject. The change in the law of that state is but
illustrative of the modem tendency to uphold charitable bequests
and in so doing obviously to benefit the community as a whole.
H.A.L.
" Matter of Shattuck, 193 N. Y. 446 (19o8).
t203 N. Y. 380 (1911).

